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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-WARRANTLESS
IN-HOME ARREST IN ABSENCE OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES VIO-
LATES FOURTH AMENDMENT. United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297
(8th Cir. 1979). In the early morning hours, Bureau of Indian Affairs
police received a call that Edward Houle had threatened to shoot his
cousin at her father's house. When investigating officers arrived at the
father's house, they heard two shots, which one officer identified as
coming from the direction of defendant's house. The officers removed
the cousin and her two children from the house to police headquarters,
where they received a call from a man who identified himself as Houle
and threatened to shoot any officer that came into his yard. Four hours
later police decided to arrest Houle for interfering with the perform-
ance of their duties.' Arriving at his house without a warrant, the of-
ficers looked through a broken window and saw Houle asleep with a
rifle lying nearby. One officer reached through the window and seized
the rifle while other officers kicked down the door and arrested Houle.
At trial defendant objected to the admission into evidence of the rifle, a
rifle clip, and two spent cartridges2 seized by police at the time of ar-
rest.3 The trial court overruled defendant's motion to suppress4 and
convicted the defendant. The Eighth Circuit reversed and held- A
warrantless arrest of a person in his home, absent exigent circum-
stances, violates the fourth amendment.
I Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with
any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the
performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned more than ten years, or both.
I U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
2. The record is silent where the spent cartridges came from and whether the rifle had been
tircd. No evidence was found of bullet holes in any nearby house or vehicle. United States v.
Houle. 603 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.2 (8th Cir. 1979).
3. The issue of illegal arrest arises only when the prosecution attempts to introduce at trial
cvidence obtained during a search incident to an arrest. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the
Supreme Court: Further Ventures into ihe "Quagmire," 8 CRINI. L. BULL. 9, 23 (1972). The exclu-
,ionary rule provides that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Con-
Ntitution is inadmissible. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. The trial court found that the police officers had probable cause to make the arrest so that
no warrant was necessary under United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
5. 603 F.2d at 1299.
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The fourth amendment guarantees the right of persons to be secure
against "unreasonable searches and seizures."6 Because an arrest is a
"seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment,7 an arrest must
meet the fourth amendment standard of reasonableness. The reasona-
bleness standard represents the constitutional balance between two
countervailing interests: the interest of society in apprehending
criminals and the interest of the individual in personal privacy.8
To meet this standard of reasonableness, police can make an arrest
only when they have probable cause to believe that a person has com-
mitted a crime.9 In addition to the probable cause requirement, some
courts have construed "reasonableness" to demand a warrant, in the
absence of exigent circumstances,' 0 for arrests made on private prem-
ises.' l The Constitution, however, does not explicitly require police
officers to obtain a warrant to effect a lawful arrest, and the Supreme
Court has declined to transform the judicial preference for arrest war-
rants into a constitutional rule. 2
Thus in United States v. Watson,'3 the Court held that a warrantless
arrest in a public place, if based upon probable cause, does not violate
the fourth amendment. 4 Similarly in United States v. Santana,15 the
6. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
7. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 436-
37 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. i, 16 (1968).
8. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
9. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
10. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 481 (1971) (plurality opinion) (warrant re-
quirement takes decision to arrest away from police and places it with neutral, disinterested mag-
istrate, and thus shields the privacy interest from "well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous
executive officers").
11. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103;
113 (1975).
12. When exigent circumstances exist, a warrant is not required because the police interest
supersedes the person's right to privacy. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967)
("the Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation
if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others"); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (warrantless arrests are valid when "the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative").
13. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
14. Id. at 424.
15. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
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Court ruled that the arrest of a person standing in the doorway to her
home in open view from a public street does not require a warrant
because the person has no expectation of privacy.' 6 In both cases, how-
ever, the Court left open the question of "whether and under what cir-
cumstances a police officer may enter the home of a suspect in order to
make a warrantless arrest."' 7
Lower courts have split over the issue of whether warrantless arrests
may be effected inside of private dwellings in the absence of exigent
circumstances.' Dorman v. United States'9 marked the first case to
condemn warrantless arrests in the home absent exigent circum-
stances.20 Five Circuits,2 ' as well as several state courts,22 have fol-
lowed Dorman's lead. The New York Court of Appeals, however, has
decided to uphold warrantless arrests based solely upon probable
16. Id. at 42.
The Court has ruled that the fourth amendment protects the privacy of persons and not of
places. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
hubject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted). "[What] has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of pri-
vacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
17. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 45 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 433 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
18. Cases upholding the warrant requirement include: United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d
22 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North Carolina,
432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970); Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). Contra, People v.
Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), prob. juris noted sub nom.
Riddick v. New York, 441 U.S. 930 (1979). See general/, LaFave, supra note 3, at 20-28; Roten-
berg & Tanzer, Searchingfor the Person To Be Seized, 35 OHio ST. L.J. 56 (1974); Note, The
Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 STAN. L. REV. 995 (1971); Comment,
Watson and Santana: Death Knellfor Arrest Warrants, 28 SYRACuSE L. REV. 787 (1977).
19. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
20. The Dorman court ruled that "[fireedom from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the
archetype of privacy protection secured by the fourth amendment." Id. at 389.
21. See United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Prescott,
581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984,
490 (4th Cir. 1970).
The Eighth Circuit previously discussed the issue in Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348
(8th Cir. 1974), but did not decide it because of the presence of exigent circumstances upon which
the court could dispose of the case. Id. at 1350.
22. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 275, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636,
cert. denied. 429 U.S. 929 (1976); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 497, 491 P.2d 575, 580 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 805, 329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1975).
Number 4] 1135
Washington University Open Scholarship
1136 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:1133
cause,23 reasoning that an arrest, even in the home, does not signifi-
cantly infringe on a person's privacy.24 The American Law Institute
follows the minority view and does not require a warrant to arrest i
person at home under either the Model Penal Code25 or the Model
23. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 312, 380 N.E.2d 224, 230, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 401 (1978),
prob.juris. notedsub nom. Riddick v. New York, 441 U.S. 930 (1979). In Riddick police detectives
arrested defendant without warrant in his home. The detectives had been looking for Riddick
since 1973 when he was identified as the perpetrator of a 1971 armed robbery. The police knew
Riddick's address for approximately two months before the arrest.
24. The New York court stated: "In view of the minimal intrusion on the elements of privacy
of the home which results from an entry on the premises for making an arrest. . . we perceive no
sufficient reason for distinguishing between an arrest in a public place and an arrest in a resi-
dence." Id. at 310-11, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
The court relied heavily on the distinction between an entry to search and an entry to arrest. 1d.
at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400. An entry to search "will be more extensive and
more intensive and the resulting invasion of. . .privacy of greater magnitude than what might be
expected to occur on an entry made for the purpose of effecting an arrest." Id. One article,
however, noted that the language of the fourth amendment will not support this distinction. See
Rotenberg & Tanzer, supra note 18, at 56. Several courts have agreed. See, e.g., United v. Pres-
cott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1349 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[tlhe sanctity of the home is no less threatened when the
object of the police entry is the seizure of a person rather than a thing"); Morrison v. United
States, 262 F.2d 449, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("The officers entered the house to make a search. It
was to be sure a search for a person rather than the usual search for an article of property, but it
was a search."); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 595, 267 N.W.2d 278, 283 (1978) ("an arrest is
subject to a warrant requirement no less exacting than that applicable where the entry is made to
effect a search for one's papers and effects"). Supreme Court Justice Marshall also shares this
view: A "warrant is required in the search situation to protect the privacy of the individual, but
there can be no less invasion of privacy when the individual himself, rather than his property, is
searched and seized." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 446 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting),
An arrest can entail a limited search for property as well as the search for the person. First,
during a search incident to a legal arrest, the police may search the suspect, the area within his
reach, and areas of the home such as closets from which he needs to get personal belongings
before leaving with the officer. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Second, under the
plain view rule, an officer may seize evidence within view. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
25. Section 120.1 of the Code reads:
(1) Authority to Arrest Without a Warrant. A law enforcement officer may arrest a
person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person
has committed
(a) a felony;
(b) a misdeameanor, and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person
(i) will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested; or
(ii) may cause injury to himself or others or damage to property unless immedi-
ately arrested; or
(c) a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor in the officer's presence.
(2) Reasonable Cause. "Reasonable cause to believe" means a basis for belief in the
existence of facts which, in view of the circumstances under and the purpose for which
the standard is applied, is substantial, objective, and sufficient to satisfy applicable con-
stitutional requirements. An arrest shall not be deemed to have been made on insuffi-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/10
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Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. 6
In United States v. Houle the Eighth Circuit expressly declined to
balance the competing interests involved in warrantless entries into
homes to arrest suspects, 7 but chose to rely on other opinions in the
federal courts and state courts that discussed the issue.28  The court
cient cause hereunder solely on the ground that the officer is unable to determine the
particular crime which may have been committed.
(3) Determining Reasonable Cause. In determining whether reasonable cause exists to
justify an arrest under this Section, a law enforcement officer may take into account all
information that a prudent officer would judge relevant to the likelihood that a crime has
been committed and that a person to be arrested has committed it, including information
derived from any expert knowledge which the officer in fact possesses and information
received from an informant whom it is reasonable under the circumstances to credit,
whether or not at the time of making the arrest the officer knows the informant's identity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 120.1 (1975).
26. Section 120.6 of the Code reads:
(1) Demand to Enter and Entry onto Priate Premises to Make an Arrest. If a law en-
forcement officer has reasonble cause to believe that a person whom he is authorized to
arrest is present on any private premises, he may, upon identifying himself as such an
officer, demand that he be admitted to such premises for the purpose of making the
arrest. If such demand is not promptly complied with, the officer may thereupon enter
such premises to make the arrest, using such force as is reasonably necessary, subject to
the provisions of Section 120.7 regarding the use of deadly force.
(2) Entri, Without Prior Demand. The demand to be admitted required by Subsection
(1). need not be made, if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person whom
he is authorized to arrest for a felony or misdemeanor is present on such premises, and
that if such demand were made,
(a) the person to be arrested would escape;
(b) the officer would be subject to harm in effecting the arrest; or
(c) any person would be harmed, or evidence destroyed, or property damaged or lost.
(3) Special Restrictions on Arrests at Night. No law enforcement officer shall seek to
enter any private premises in order to make an arrest between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. unless
(a) he is acting under a warrant of arrest and the warrant authorizes its execution
during such hours, or
(b) he has reasonable cause to believe that such action is necessary to prevent
(i) the escape of a person to be arrested for a crime involving serious bodily
harm or the threat or danger thereof, or
(ii) harm to any person, destruction of evidence, or damage to or loss of prop-
erty.
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 120.6 (1975).
Even under these criteria, however, Houle's arrest is illegal because the officers (I) did not
identify themselves and demand admittance in accordance with § 120.6(l), and (2) entered the
home before 7 a.m., in violation of § 120.6(3).
27. To support its rejection of warrantless entries into a private home, the Houle court turned
to the fourth amendment and concluded that an arrest is a seizure of the person, which must meet
the fourth amendment's standard of reasonableness. 603 F.2d at 1299.
28. Id. The court relied on cases that advocated privacy of the home. See, e.g., United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed"); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (fourth amendment is intended to protect "the sanctities of a man's home
and the privacies of life"); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("The Fourth
Washington University Open Scholarship
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concluded from these decisions2 9 that a person's right to privacy is
equally intruded upon whether the police invade the home to search
for a person or for property. °
The Houle court also rejected the government's contention that exi-
gent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest, reasoning that the
police were not in "hot pursuit" and had no reason to believe that de-
fendant would attempt to escape or destroy evidence." This summary
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government
intrusion."); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1958) (law "drastically limited the
authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect the arrest. Such action invades the
precious interest of privacy summed up in the ancient adage that a man's house is his castle");
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948) (privacy is "too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals"); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is
a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reason-
able security and freedom from surveillance"); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 390 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (fourth amendment "assures citizens the privacy and security of their homes"); Ac-
carino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ("A man in his own home has a right of
privacy which he does not have when on a public street. The additional right imposes additional
requirements upon the power of arrest."); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 805, 329
N.E.2d 717, 722 (1975) ("The right of police officers to enter a home, for whatever purpose, repre-
sents a serious governmental intrusion into one's privacy. It was just this sort of intrusion that the
Fourth Amendment was designed to circumscribe. ... )
29. 603 F.2d at 1299. The court noted that the "vast majority of state and federal decisions
have applied the same Fourth Amendment standards to warrantless entries to search as they have
to warrantless entries to arrest." Id. See note 21 supra. The court then stated that, until the
Supreme Court issues a mandate to the contrary, it would follow the principle set forth in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971) (plurality opinion), which offered strong
dictum favoring an arrest warrant in private places. 603 F.2d 1299-1300, See note I I supra and
accompanying text.
In decisions since Coolidge, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the issue of warrantless
arrests in the home in the absence of exigent circumstances remains unresolved. See note 17 supra
and accompanying text.
30. Generally, police officers must obtain a search warrant before entering a private place to
search for an object. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925). The judge or commis-
sioner will issue a warrant when satisfied that grounds for the warrant exist or that there is proba-
ble cause to believe that such grounds exist. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; FBD. R. CklM. P. 41(c). The
Court, however, has fashioned certain exceptions to the search warrant requirement: (a) search
incident to lawful arrest, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); (b) consent search, e.g.,
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); (c) search of vehicle based on probable cause, e.g.,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); (d) search in hot pursuit of dangerous, fleeing suspect,
e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (e) search of abandoned property, e.g., Abel v.
United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); (f) search of open field, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S.
57 (1924); and (g) border search, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
31. 603 F.2d at 1300.
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approach is a departure from Dorman's seven-part criteria32 for deter-
mining exigent circumstances, which the Eighth Circuit previously had
adopted.33 The Houle court's approach, however, is not necessarily a
repudiation of Dorman and its definition of exigent circumstances be-
cause "hot pursuit" and fear of escape or destruction of evidence con-
stitute components of Dorman's seven criteria.34 Although the Houle
court creates some confusion,35 the Dorman standards appear to be
controlling.
32. 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Exigent circumstances were found to exist based
on the following considerations: (I) a crime of violence was involved; (2) the suspect was reason-
ably believed to be armed- (3) there was a clear showing of probable cause; (4) there was strong
reason to believe the suspect was on the premises; (5) there was a likelihood that the suspect would
escape if not swiftly apprehended: (6) the entry was peaceable; and (7) the entry took place during
the day.
33. Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348, 1352 (8th Cir. 1974). In Salvador police made a
warrantless arrest for bank robbery at the conclusion of a high-speed chase. The court determined
exigent circumstances justified the arrest because: (I) a crime of violence was involved; (2) the
suspects were reasonably believed to be armed- (3) there was a clear showing of probable cause;
(4) there was a strong reason to believe the suspect was on the premises; (5) there was a likelihood
the suspect would escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the entry was peaceable. The court
did not consider the seventh Dorman criteria, the time of day of the arrest.
Other courts adopting the Dorman standards are United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 26 (2d
Cir. 1978); United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d
886. 893 (6th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 990 (4th Cir. 1970).
34. Even when a court applies the Dorman criteria the court's determination of whether exi-
gent circumstances exist remains largely subjective. The Dorman court, for example, found the
likelihood-of-escape criterion satisfied because defendant's parole papers had been left at the
scene of the crime. "There was at least a possibility that delay might permit escape, when and if
the suspect came to realize his papers had been left behind." 435 F.2d at 393. In Campbell the
crucial fact was the possibility that defendants would notice the absence of an accomplice (who
had been arrested). "There were.., reasonable grounds to believe that the appellants may have
been informed of Hall's arrest, or may have surmised the same from his absence, and that unless
they were arrested immediately, they might attempt an escape ...." 581 F.2d at 26. The court
)n Sh/,e acknowledged escape would be impossible, but still found the presence of this exigent
circurstance. "Although there was tittle likelihood of escape, due to the presence of so many
uficers, there was, nevertheless, a substantial likolihuod of bloodshed or an impending siege if
qui. action were not talkcn." 492 F.2d at 892 (parenthetical omitted). In Vance yet another
iii it the defendant was at largc before the crime-proved there was a likelihood of escape.
%anc was at large some three months after the issuance of the parole violator's warrant, and this
I' mt alon.. supports an inference that he was likely to escape if not swiftly apprehended." 432 F.2d
.. 991.
35. Another difference in the treatment of exigent circumstances by the Eighth Circuit is the
methodology of the decisions. In Sahvddor the court decided the issue of exigency before it found
it necessary to reach the issue of whether a warrant would be needed in the absence of exigent
.ircumstances. In Houle the court first determined that a warrant is required for an arrest in a
private home in the absence of exAgent circumstances and then turned to the issue of whether
sAlgent circumintonces were present in the case.
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The Houle decision is consistent with the view of the majority of
lower courts and reaffirms the fourth amendment's role as protector of
the home against unreasonable intrusions. Supreme Court dicta, how-
ever, conflict on the issue,36 leading some commentators to speculate in
light of Watson and Santana 37 that the Court will abolish the public-
private distinction and the warrant requirement for in-home arrests. 3 8
The question may be resolved soon because the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on the issue in another case.39
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT-HouSING-UNIFORM RELOCATION
ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO PRIVATE DEVELOPER WITH EMINENT Do-
MAIN POWERS. Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1979). Plain-
tiffs' sought a preliminary injunction to restrain work in a planned
36. Compare United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976) (one may not escape arrest by
fleeing to private place) and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (Court has never invali-
dated an arrest based, on probable cause because officers failed to obtain warrant), with United
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. at 45 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("in the absence of exigent circum-
stances, the police may not arrest a suspect without a warrant") and McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300, 314 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("normally an arrest should be made only on a warrant
issued by a magistrate on a showing of 'probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,' as
required by the Fourth Amendment").
37. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
38. The Santana decision constituted "a significant enlargement of the area available for
warrantless arrests. By grafting Katz onto Watson, the majority had allowed the police freedom
to effect warrantless arrests in private areas so long as the suspect was in open view." Comment,
Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Castle, 82 DIcK. L.
REv. 167, 178 (1977). The Supreme Court decisions indicate "that since, historically, probable
cause and not a warrant has been the standard for a valid arrest, the logical result for at least four
members of the Court is that an arrest warrant is not required even for an arrest on private prem-
ises." Comment, supra note 18, at 788.
39. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), prob. jurs.
notedsub nom. Riddick v. New York, 441 U.S. 930 (1979). The Supreme Court has accepted the
Riddick case to address the issue of warrantless in-home arrests in the absence of exigent circum-
stances. If the Riddick case is upheld, the Houle decision might still stand because of the differ-
ence in the method of entry. In Houle the police broke the door down without identifying
themselves and demanding admittance. In Riddick police were peaceably admitted by defend-
ant's child.
1. Plaintiffs represented "a class of persons who are present and former lower-income,
predominantly black residents" in the redevelopment area located in St. Louis, Missouri. Young
v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 872 (8th Cir. 1979).
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